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IS THINKING MERELY THE ACTION OF 
LANGUAGE MECHANISMS1?   (I.) 
BY F. C. BARTLETT AND E. M. SMITH. 
1. Statement of the problem. 
2. The distinction between vocal and language habits1 
3. The distinction between explicit and implicit language. 
4. Thinking considered as a form of expression. 
5. Thinking and its conditions. 
1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. 
SINCE this Symposium is intended to take its starting point from Prof. J. 
B. Watson's recent discussion of "Explicit and Implicit Language  
Habits 2, we will begin with a very brief statement of what seem to us to 
be the main points of his argument: 
1. Thought is nothing more than a highly integrated bodily 
activity (page 325), chiefly identified with the action of language 
mechanisms (page 316); but not all thought is "laryngeal" (page 324). 
2. Vocal habits are distinguished from true language habits, the 
former being mere repetitions of sounds, and the latter being vocal 
habits "associated with arm, hand and leg activities and substi-
tutable for them" (page 319). 
3. In general, language habits undergo development from overt 
to whispered and implicit expression: thought may be reasonably 
assumed always to involve implicit expression (pages 323-4). 
We have to ask whether propositions 2 and 3 justify proposition 1. Let 
us consider one of Prof. Watson's own illustrations: "When we study 
implicit bodily processes we are studying thought; just as when we study 
the way a golfer stands in addressing his ball and swinging bis club we are 
studying golf" (page 326). But to say that we are studying 'golf' in the 
second case is to assume that 'golf'—the structure and character 
1 A contribution to the Symposium presented at the Congress of Philosophy in 
Oxford. 24-27 September, 1920. 
2 See his Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, 1919, chapter ix. 
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of the game itself—is identical with how a given player plays golf. 
Similarly Prof. Watson assumes that 'thought' is, for scientific psycho-
logy, identical with its expression. This involves the central assumption 
of Prof. Watson's system, and raises the following questions: 
(i) Should the psychological study of thinking be confined to a 
determination of the varieties of thought responses in relation to 
their conditions? 
(ii) Assuming this to be the case, can Prof. Watson's solution of 
the problem be regarded as satisfactory? 
The second is the narrower problem and will be attacked first. 
2. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOCAL AND LANGUAGE HABITS. 
This distinction emphasizes the fact that from the first the use of 
language is bound up with the substitution of one mode of response for 
other modes. 
That both language and thinking do, in a sense, involve substitution is 
obvious. Both are acquirements gained during the life-time of the 
individual, and represent modes of response to a situation which, in the 
course of development, may replace earlier types of reaction. But sub-
stitution is an ambiguous word. The mere replacement of one set of 
movements by another is certainly not enough to constitute a language 
habit. For if it were, every conditioned reflex, for example, would be a 
language expression. According to Prof. Watson himself the " conditioned 
reflex level of functioning" gives us, at most, vocal habit; for the "true 
language habit" we must have this, "plus1 later associative connection of 
the word when learned with the bodily habits connected with the object 
for which the word stands " (page 320). Precisely what "later associative 
connection " means, in this context, Prof. Watson never attempts to say. 
Bearing in mind that, for the present, we are not questioning Prof. 
Watson's general psychological standpoint, we may attempt to work out 
what is really involved in the idea of substitution. 
The consideration that language represents a mode of response to a 
situation to which earlier adjustment has been made in a different 
manner, will not carry us far. Not only must there be a capability of 
substitution, but the substituted modes of adjustment must definitely 
function as 'signs.' 
Now if we stop short at substitution, the new modes of adjustment 
might  be  regarded  as 'standing for' those alone which  they have 
1 Italics ours. 
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replaced. But signs involve a necessary reference to consequent adjust-
ments, as well as a possible reference to those modes of responses which 
their present expression has replaced. A sign may be defined, from the 
present point of view, as any mode of reaction which is succeeded, within 
the total adjustment to the same situation, by other specific modes of 
reaction. The sign, that is to say, 'leads on to' a further series of 
responses, where 'leads on to' may be taken to mean 'is in the majority 
of cases found to be accompanied by.' 
But many modes of response which do not come under the head of 
speech are certainly signs, and, whether they are to be regarded as language 
or not, do not serve specifically as instruments of thinking. Any series of 
responses whatsoever, which are arranged in a relatively definite order, 
constitutes a series of signs in this sense. For example, the adjustments 
made by an engine driver in becoming aware of a held-up signal are signs 
for a further series of adjustments made by him in putting on brakes. 
At this stage a further point should become clear. Supposing we 
specify language as a series of substitute signs; all signs are not of the 
same nature, and do not fulfil the same function. The most important 
consideration which follows is that, while some signs may have place in 
series in which the other adjustments are made by response of the 
'special sense' organs, or of the larger muscles of the body, others lead 
to forms of expression for which the organs involved in the production 
of words alone appear to be entirely adequate. Thus to specify language 
as a substitution form, or even as substitute-sign forms, is inadequate. 
3. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT LANGUAGE. 
Can Prof. Watson's treatment of the development of implicit language 
be regarded as any more complete or satisfactory than his specification 
of the character of the language response? He suggests that, in its 
growth, language makes " transition from overt to whispered and then to 
implicit" expression. This is not regarded as strict chronology however, 
for all three forms may "go on together from the start" (page 322). The 
two important points are, first, that practically all developed forms of 
language expression include responses which are of the implicit order; 
and, second, that particularly when we begin to study implicit expressions 
we are reminded that many other bodily processes besides movements of 
the vocal musculature may take part in expressing language (page 274). 
Implicit language is simply language expression of an extremely 
"abbreviated, short-circuited and economized" type (page 323) and the 
movements it involves are excessively difficult to observe, to recognise, 
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and to interpret. That there certainly is a tendency towards ever more and 
more abbreviated forms of language expression we believe every one will 
be prepared to agree, and also that the thinking response frequently 
expresses itself in these abbreviated forms. 
Moreover, no doubt Prof. Watson's claim that many other bodily 
processes besides the vocal may play a part in the expression of thought is 
sound. Their occurrence is demonstrable in many instances, and probable 
in all. Particularly when it is remembered that Prof. Watson clearly states 
that he has no desire to " abstract language overt or implicit, or other 
implicit thought processes, from their general setting in bodily integration 
as a whole" (page 324), it is perfectly clear that the total thinking reaction 
must probably in all cases involve other than merely vocal movements. 
Prof. Watson candidly admits that the evidence for the existence, and 
function, of these 'implicit' processes is extremely incomplete (pages 326-
7). For our part, however, we are willing to agree both that processes of 
the kind described accompany most, or perhaps all, thinking, and that 
their development is of importance. 
4. THINKING CONSIDERED AS A FORM OF EXPRESSION. 
We have already suggested there is no valid reason for holding that all 
employment of substitute signs involves thinking. A movement, or set of 
movements, present at any stage of the performance of a well-established 
habit is, from the point of view of expression, a sign, or set of signs. Both 
itself and subsequent movements belonging to the habit are likely to be 
abbreviated, and hence in a definite sense to be substituted for an original 
response, which was more complex and may have been different in nature. 
Yet we cannot agree that the simple unrolling of a habit is rightly termed 
thinking. Habitual response is not limited to non-vocal movements; for 
many of the word reactions of the ordinary man are simply habits. Catch 
words are repeated; the same stories are told over and over again in the 
same words and with the same appearance of originality. But all this is no 
more thinking than the repetition of a perfectly learned series of nonsense 
syllables is thinking. The truth is that while all substitute signs may 
properly be treated as language, some only function as expressing thought. 
The thought response sign is essentially one which remains constant 
amid the greatest divergency of setting. From the point of view of 
expression, signs may certainly occur at the level of sensing, since any 
part of a process of sensing may bear a definite and fixed relation to other 
parts which precede and follow it. But sense signs are tied to immediately 
presented physical stimuli in the absence of which they do not occur. 
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Similarly signs are present in the process of perceiving but are tied to 
presented combinations of physical stimuli. In imaging, again, the mode 
of response always involves the use of substitute signs, which are 
frequently of an abbreviated character, and yet we rightly distinguish 
thinking from imaging. The fact is that the thinking response occurs, 
not to a physical stimulus alone, or to a combination of physical stimuli, 
but to some characteristic of a presented object or situation which is 
common to that and to many other objects or situations. Not only is it 
a response to such a characteristic, but in so far as the reaction is one of 
thinking, it is made precisely as if the characteristic were presented in an 
entirely different setting. 
We may take one of Prof. Watson's own illustrations (page 330). " I 
start in to build a bridle path to the top of a hill with nospecial instruments 
and never having built a road before. If the grade is too steep I build my 
road around the side of the hill, taking advantage of various level places 
to approach the top; where the stones are too large or cannot easily be 
dislodged I build the road around them, finally coming out at the top. 
The process of constructing such a path requires manual labour almost 
wholly....Nevertheless, it is constructive work....In the process, though, 
parts of many previously organized habit systems have been used 
momentarily in slightly new connections. Just so in simple thought 
work...." Now it is not "just so," either in simple thought work or in the 
construction of a new road in so far as this is a relevant illustration. If it 
were and we inspected the road Prof. Watson had made, we should be 
surprised at the number of false starts to be found. It sounds perfectly 
simple to say," if the grade is too steep I build my road around the side of 
the hill." But the real fact of the case is concealed in that statement. In 
so far as the response is a thought response it is definitely a response to 
steepness; not merely to a particular set of visual reactions, because that 
would not lead on, of itself, to the further set of muscular and other 
reactions involved in making the path round the hill; not merely to the 
steepness of this hill, because that also would not take me round it; but 
essentially to steepness as a quality common to this and to other situa-
tions and independent of any particularcontext. My construction of a path 
having a certain direction may, at least partially, be treated as solely 
the working out of habitual motor series. But what, in this instance, 
switches me off from the series 'going in this direction' to the series 
'going in that,' is the response to a universal quality or relation. That, 
and that alone, gives us the peculiar characteristic of thinking. 
Can we find any mode of expression specialised to the thinking 
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response? Here we return to language and particularly to vocal language. 
Prof. Watson remarks that " the anatomy of the neck and upper thorax 
regions is the most complicated of the whole body " (page 313). Certainly 
vocal expression, together with its immediately associated movements, 
offers the most extraordinary possibility of varied combinations within 
which identical elements recur. Moreover, while sensory responses and 
manipulative responses involving the grosser muscles of the body are 
normally largely tied to particular forms of stimulation or to particular 
concrete objects, vocal response is much more readily conditioned by any 
stimulus or combination of stimuli whatever, and by the qualities or 
relations of which we have just spoken. 
It may also appear as if emotional expression frequently occurs under 
much the same conditions. But emotional responses are, on the whole, 
themselves tied to particular characteristics and typical situations; the 
resulting bodily adjustments tend, consequently, to be more strictly 
limited and predictable. This we should expect in view of their close 
relationship to instinct. The emotional response is therefore less suited 
to express reactions to characteristics that must both combine with all 
possible settings, and remain unconstrained by any particular setting. 
It remains that language alone is perfectly well adapted to the expression 
of a reaction to universal characters in our environment. 
But words may equally well constitute the response to other characters 
of our environment, and consequently the question arises as to whether 
there is any peculiarity about those word expressions which are really 
thinking responses. The characteristics suggested by Prof. Watson are 
abbreviation, short-circuiting and economising. These no doubt apply, 
but they are not sufficient. With familiarity a single glance at a compli-
cated object may do as much as, with unfamiliarity, may be effected by 
long and intricate manipulative processes. It is not unlikely that 
abbreviation is carried to a higher degree in thinking processes than in 
any others; but this must at best be a very indefinite criterion. 
Two suggestions seem possible. First, word-thinking reactions might 
be catalogued, and then we could identify an instance when it occurred 
in any concrete setting. But this will not work; for what is in origin 
thinking may, in repetition, become habitual. Thus the same word 
response either may, or may not, indicate thinking, and there seems to be 
no expression difference between the words as such, which can be used to 
discriminate the two cases. 
Secondly, Prof. Watson truly regards thinking as a very complex 
process; and reminds us that it must not be abstracted from its general 
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bodily setting. Can the manner in which a certain word response is related 
to other reactions amid which it is found be used as a criterion of thinking? 
Two remarks may be hazarded. The first is that if we confine ourselves to 
a single occasion of thinking we can find no such peculiarity of relation. 
The second is that (a) if, taking a large number of word responses, we find 
that the expression in question has practically the same antecedents and 
consequents arranged in practically the same order, the reaction is purely 
automatic in character; but if the surroundings of the response, and their 
order of arrangement, differ, thinking may be present; and (6) if we 
arrange a number of instances varying in many respects but alike in some 
feature, or in general alike but differing in some particular aspect, we 
shall find that the true thinking response to these is characterized both by 
a minimum of delay1 and by relatively little 'false starting.' Either (a) or 
(6) might give us a true expression criterion of a thinking process. But the 
test could be made reliable only after a detailed study of the conditions of 
the combination of habits, and it must be admitted that, at present, even at 
the best, we cannot, from a study of expression alone, say with more than 
a high degree of probability that a thinking reaction has occurred. This 
however is no very alarming consideration, for as a matter of fact it may 
be doubted whether we ever can say more. 
5. THINKING AND ITS CONDITIONS. 
Throughout the whole of his treatment of psychology Prof. Watson 
assumes that the study should be confined to a determination of the 
conditions of human responses, and of their adjustments. For our part we 
are willing to share this assumption, only remarking that it gives us no 
warrant for supposing, as Prof. Watson is prone to do, that problems of 
their conditions and variations exhaust all the important questions 
relevant to human responses. But this admission does not justify an identi-
fication of a response with its expression, whether the latter is overt or 
implicit. The danger of the reference to implicit expression becomes 
manifest at this point. Implicit expression only differs from explicit 
expression in that it is usually slighter, subtler and far more difficult to 
observe. It gradually undergoes attenuation until it becomes a mere 
assumption, whereupon it becomes easy, and appears plausible, to identify 
the expression with the response. We maintain, however, that the response 
and the expression of the response are, not only in thinking, but in all 
human reactions whatsoever, two different things.  Throughout his dis- 
1 The overt expression of thought, however, may be considerably delayed. 
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cussion Prof. Watson almost invariably speaks of 'thought,' scarcely ever 
of  'thinking,' and in this way the distinction between response and 
expression appears to be slurred over. It may well be the case that 
whenever we think, we employ language in some form or another, but 
obviously this does not prove that the act of thinking and the language 
movement are the same. 
Can thinking, considered apart from its expression, form a subject of 
psychological study? Only in the most meagre manner. It might perhaps 
be said that thinking always involves response to relations and qualities 
as such, and it might even be possible to indicate to some extent its inter-
relation with other processes. But any further progress would speedily 
demand an examination of the different modes in which thinking finds 
expression. 
One further question remains: if we agree that psychology is, in so far 
as it is properly scientific, confined to a study of the conditions under 
which responses to a situation are made, what must we be willing to 
include under conditions? The answer is that we must include (1) a study 
of the character of the external situation, and (2) an account of the con-
ditions which have place within the life history of the individual concerned. 
Among the latter, and of extreme importance in the case of thinking, are 
needs, wants, desires and affective processes which are all no more 
identical with their expression than is thinking itself. 
We therefore conclude that so long as attention is confined to a study 
of the conditions of expression and the variations of the thinking response, 
Prof. Watson's treatment is broadly upon the right lines, but must be 
regarded as inadequately developed in respect to its details. At the same 
time the psychology of thinking, while it must be treated as a scientific 
study of the conditions and varieties of the thinking response, is only 
partially covered by an examination of the modes in which thought is 
expressed. 
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